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ABSTRACT
DRAM-based main memory and its associated components
increasingly account for a significant portion of application
performance bottlenecks and power budget demands inside
the computing ecosystem. To alleviate the problems of stor-
age density and power constraints associated with DRAM,
system architects are investigating alternative non-volatile
memory technologies such as Phase ChangeMemory (PCM)
to either replace or be used alongside DRAMmemory. While
such alternative memory types offer many promises to over-
come the DRAM-related issues, they present a significant
security threat to the users due to persistence of memory data
even after power down.
In this paper, we investigate smart mechanisms to obscure
the data left in non-volatile memory after power down. In
particular, we analyze the effect of using a single encryp-
tion algorithm versus differentiated encryption based on the
security needs of the application phases. We also explore
the effect of encryption on a hybrid main memory that has
a DRAM buffer cache plus PCM main memory. Our mech-
anism takes into account the limited write endurance prob-
lem associated with several non-volatile memory technolo-
gies including PCM, and avoids any additional writes be-
yond those originally issued by the applications. We evalu-
ate using Gem5 simulator and SPEC 2006 applications, and
show the performance and power overheads of our proposed
design.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the growing prevalence of multi-core and accelerator-
rich processor architectures, the DRAM main memory sub-
system is facing increasing pressure to retain the working
sets of all of the threads executing on the individual cores.
This is necessary to guarantee high application performance
and avoid expensive trips to disks during program execu-
tion, as well as sustain scalable performance under limited
energy and power budgets. Consequently, system architects
have begun to look for alternative memory types such as
Phase Change Memory (PCM) with higher storage density
and comparable performance that show viable promise as a
substitute for DRAM technology [1, 2].
Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) technologies, such as PCM,
can offer power benefits by removing the need for periodic
DRAM refreshes necessary to retain the memory contents.
Also, when the system enters one of the power-saving modes
(low-power or sleep states), NVM retains the program code
and data due to their non-volatile nature. Consequently, when
the system enters the active state again, the application can
resume without any significant performance penalty that may
otherwise occur in DRAM owing to its inability to retain the
memory contents without the refresh operations in certain
system low-power states.
Despite such powerful advantages, the NVM can be a sig-
nificant security challenge for user data privacy, and may
potentially lead to illegitimate data exfiltration to unautho-
rized users especially when the runtime system is not ac-
tively protecting its data (e.g., when the system is entirely
powered down or when the runtime is suspended due to the
system being in a low power mode). A malicious user who
has physical access to the system could simply extract the
sensitive secrets that may be stored inside the memory (say,
after system power down) and/or overwrite the memory con-
tents to hijack the program execution (say, after the system
resumes to active state). Such scenarios can lead to severely
compromising the user’s privacy or have detrimental effect
on the execution of some important user applications. There-
fore, it is necessary to investigate methods that improve the
security of NVM and defend them against persistence-based
memory attacks.
We note that a key consideration for a solution proposal
that seeks to defend many NVM types (including PCM) against
memory persistence-based threats is to be cognizant of their
limited write endurance issue. That is, NVM technologies
such as PCM are expected to sustain an average of 108 to
1010 writes per cell throughout their lifetime, after which the
cell’s programming element breaks and the write operations
can no longer change the values of the memory cells [3].
Therefore, it becomes necessary to reduce or avoid addi-
tional memory write operations beyond those that are issued
by the system normally. Even if a future NVM technology
were to support unlimited write endurance (e.g., spintronic
memory technologies such as MRAM), we note that avoid-
ing additional, unnecessary memory write operations will
immensely benefit the overall system performance by reduc-
ing memory bandwidth traffic. Therefore, our design consid-
eration to avoid (or at least, significantly reduce) additional
memory writes will be the key to enable smooth integration
of security-enhancing features of NVM types into the future
system architectures.
In this paper, we present an NVRAMdata protection scheme
that encrypts the data before being written to NVM and per-
forms decryption upon data read using a randomly generated
key-pair that is unique for every session, where a session
is defined as the interval between two consecutive system
power-down events. During a session, the system may be
in one of the active or low-power states. To minimize the
overheads of encryption/decryption and reduce the impact
on memory bandwidth, we explore the use of hardware op-
timizations such as DRAM buffer cache and evaluate our
design. Our exploration offers valuable insights into how
the user data can be protected with minimal effect on main
memory and overall system performance.
In summary, the contributions of our work are:
1. We investigate mechanisms to defend non-volatile main
memory against persistence-based memory attacks by
encrypting the data prior to memory writes. Our pro-
posed technique takes into account the limited write
endurance problem of many NVM technologies, and
avoids exacerbating the problem through encrypting
the incoming data prior to memory residency.
2. We show the effect of using various encryption algo-
rithms and explore the use of a probabilistic, differ-
entiated encryption (i.e., the use of different encryp-
tion techniques) based on the security needs of the ap-
plication at various phases. We examine the use of
OS/runtime support to identify security critical pages,
and outline methods to minimize the impact on appli-
cation performance.
3. We analyze the overheads of encryption on performance-
friendly optimizations such as the use of DRAM buffer
cache for NVM main memory.
4. We describe our design and implementation, and demon-
strate our experimental findings using a range of ap-
plications from SPEC 2006 benchmark suite [5] with
varying levels of memory activity. Our results show
that our proposed techniques hold good promise to pro-
vide defenses against data persistence based attacks
while incurring low performance overheads (about 8.8%
worst case performance overhead and 3.8% worst case
power overhead in memory-intensive benchmarks).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes our threat model and assumptions, Section 3 presents
an overview of our design, Section 4 has details on our im-
plementation and optimization strategies, Section 5 presents
our evaluation setup and experimental results, Section 6 con-
tains related work, and Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2. THREAT MODEL
In this work, the fundamental threat that we seek to miti-
gate is the attacker having physical access to the main mem-
ory subsystem and his ability to exploit the persistence prop-
erty of NVM to read remanent sensitive data and/or manip-
ulate memory contents that may lead to erroneous, harmful
program behavior.
In general, there are two possible ways that an attacker
could seek access to the NVM contents – 1. An online attack
is one where a malicious application can read the working
set memory of an application that ran previously prior to the
system power down. 2. An offline attack is one where an ap-
plication can probe the memory after the system is powered
down [4]. Note that most traditional OS security models as-
sume that the main memory contents do not persist between
system reboots, and hence do not have any explicit mecha-
nisms to protect memory contents after system is powered
down.
Also, after exiting the system sleep (low-power) modes,
most NVM technologies (such as MRAM [6]) offer instant
power-on benefits with readily available memory contents
for use due to their non-volatile nature. This is because
NVM does not depend on memory refresh operations to re-
tain their contents as seen in DRAM. This normally pro-
vides the applications with an added performance benefit
of not having to re-fetch memory contents that are poten-
tially lost without the DRAM refresh operation during sys-
tem sleep. However, an adversary could exploit this NVM
property for malicious purposes. That is, when the run-
time system (which is responsible for permission and secu-
rity checks) is suspended during system sleep, a malicious
user may modify the NVM contents to cause harmful pro-
gram behavior. To counter such threats, it is necessary to
make sure that the attacker does not gain any meaningful
data while the runtime system is not actively operating on
(and protecting) the NVM.
In this work, our aim is to address data remanence based
attacks in NVM, and not to address any and all of the data
privacy threats that may occur while the system is active.
We assume that the runtime system is capable of actively
protecting the memory contents through traditionally well-
knownmemory protection and isolation mechanisms. A com-
puter system, that already has a compromised runtime sys-
tem or OS, has much greater challenges to address than hav-
ing to be concerned about memory persistence property of
NVM. Therefore, we view the attacks involving compro-
mised applications, runtime or OS to be beyond the scope
of our work.
Further, we note that memory-related attacks while the
system is in operation are not unique to NVM, and can oc-
cur in any system including DRAM, e.g., data thefts that
involve snooping of the processor-memory bus, tampered IP
blocks, covertly communicating processes that exploit mem-
ory as storage channels etc. Any existing technique that pro-
tects the memory contents and preserves data privacy dur-
ing system runtime should be applicable to NVM as well.
Our primary goal here is to seek a better understanding of
how incorporation of NVM in future systems presents newer
security challenges for the system architectures to consider
that are normally not seen in present computer architectures.
As such, memory persistence property of NVM, that is ab-
sent in traditional DRAM systems, can present newer class
of challenges to the OS and hardware architects in terms of
providing memory protection and data privacy for the sys-
tem users.
3. DESIGN OVERVIEW
In this section, we present an overview of our technique
to counter the data persistence-based attacks on NVM, and
outline our approach to hardware design that achieves the
desired solution.
In order to address our threat model in Section 2, the main
memory subsystem that uses NVM technology should not
reveal the memory contents during the system power down
that are normally assumed to be lost due to the volatile na-
ture of present DRAM-based systems. To prevent the mali-
cious users from accessing potentially sensitive main mem-
ory data, we use hardware encryption modules (that use en-
cryption algorithms like DES, AES, RSA) to encrypt the
data prior to memory writes.
Upon every system reboot, a brand new, random encryp-
tion key is generated to encrypt the main memory traffic.
This is acceptable because the main memory subsystem is
not expected to (should not) retain data between system restart
operations. This new key generation directly helps to avoid
online attacks where a malicious application reads the data
left in the NVM prior to restart (see Section 2). The en-
cryption keys are stored in special hardware registers that
are accessible only in the privileged mode. When the system
enters a low-power (sleep) state where the NVM is gated,
the OS clears the hardware registers, and stores the encryp-
tion keys as part of its kernel state that can be resumed after
the system is active again. This allows the NVM to protect
its contents from persistence based attacks while maintain-
ing its performance edge over DRAM-based main memory
because of data non-volatility even during system sleep pe-
riods. Lastly, since the encryption keys are privileged data
only accessible to a trusted OS, an abrupt system restart will
not expose this sensitive information to a malicious applica-
tion. If the attacker had the capability to subvert OS pro-
tection and performs privilege escalation, we note that the
system has been already compromised, and is under much
greater trouble compared to the risks posed by memory per-
sistence based attacks.
The choice of the appropriate encryption algorithm can
depend on the user preference for data privacy, as well as the
security demands versus memory bandwidth tradeoffs of the
application under consideration. For instance, while DES
encryption technology uses symmetric keys with 56-bit keys
that can be easily vulnerable for attacks, fast hardware im-
plementation of DES encryption using Virtex FPGA achieve
speeds up to 10.7 Gbit/sec under maximum clock frequency
of 168 MHz [5]. AES, on the other hand, uses substitution-
permutation network for encrypting data and is generally
more secure than DES. It has reported throughput of up to
121 Mbit/sec at operating clock frequency of 153 MHz and
an optimized implementation consumes 3.1k gates [6]. Op-
timized hardware implementations of RSA cryptography al-
gorithm, which utilize asymmetric keys to enhance security,
can achieve maximum throughput of about 1 Mbit/sec for
RSA 521b keys and consume 100k gates [7]. Given the dif-
ferences in speed and security offered by these various hard-
ware implementations of encryption algorithms, we let the
user to select the hardware encryption of her choice based
on her needs. For this purpose, the memory controller is pro-
visioned with programmable gates to enable the adoption of
the chosen encryption algorithm.
Prior to actual main memory writes, the data correspond-
ing to memory addresses are encrypted. Unlike SRAM caches
that store data in 32 or 64 byte blocks, the main memory
stores the data in larger granularity pages (typically, 4 KB).
Typically, the main memory row buffer holds the currently
open page, and acts as a fast access cache for the page con-
taining the requested memory address. If the data being
written is already present in the row buffer, encryption can
be delayed until the memory page is replaced and written
back into NVM. In case of row buffer misses, the encryption
algorithm needs to decrypt the page first and then perform
the write operation. If the successive writes are to different
main memory pages, the overhead of decryption/encryption
may begin to become noticeable. Also, oft-accessed mem-
ory pages may suffer from having to be decrypted frequently.
To avoid repetitive de(en)cryption latencies on the same page
for successive writes, an efficient strategy is to utilize a write
buffer that can combine multiple write operations associated
with a single page [8]. This also helps avoid repetitive invo-
cation of the encryption/decryption algorithm, and alleviates
the associated performance and power overheads that may
otherwise become significant.
For read operations from the main memory that ought to
decrypt the data prior to forwarding the resolved memory
request to upper-level SRAM caches, we note that it is suffi-
cient to perform the decryption operation just once when the
main memory row buffer is filled. When new data is fetched
into the row buffer upon replacement, the current row buffer
contents are re-encrypted and written back to the NVM.
We note that it is crucial to perform encryption prior to
data writes to the NVM due to two important reasons:
1. When the system is not properly powered down (through
an OS shutdown), the data stored in plaintext format on
the non-volatile main memory could be exposed to the
malicious hackers, leading to persistence-based mem-
ory attacks.
2. Performing encryption on data already resident in NVM
increases the total number of writes to the device. This
is detrimental to the NVM (such as PCM) that already
suffer from limited write endurance problem. There-
fore, it is essential to perform encryption before writes
to main memory in order to avoid accelerating the NVM
device failure.
Figure 1 presents an overview of our design approach.
The processor cores issue the data read and write opera-
tions to the on-chip SRAM caches. During a last-level cache
(LLC) miss, the data requests are sent to the main memory
where an encryption/decryption operations are performed on
the memory-related traffic.
In order to minimize frequent writes to NVM and to avoid
performance loss for such memory-bound applications, a hy-
brid PCM-DRAM memory configuration with a relatively
smaller DRAM buffer that acts as a faster-access cache to
retain the working set of the frequently accessed main mem-
ory pages can be used [1]. However, for applications that
can fit their working set into the caches most of the time and
incur fewer trips to the main memory in the first place, the
DRAM buffer cache may unnecessarily increase power con-
sumption. We envision the DRAM buffer cache as a feature
that may be optionally enabled when a memory-bound appli-
cation is running. On occasions where the user observes the
DRAM buffer to be less utilized (e.g., data access are always
SRAM cache hits or DRAM buffer reuse rates are extremely
Figure 1: Overview of our Self-obscuring NVM Approach
low), the DRAM buffer cache can be disabled and the last-
level cache misses can bypass it to access the non-volatile
main memory directly. The memory controller hardware
that issues memory requests is responsible for enabling and
disabling the DRAM buffer. For this purpose, the memory
controller is provisioned with a programmable function that
turns on the DRAM buffer upon request. This on-demand
DRAM availability can be controlled by the OS based on
its knowledge of memory activity of the applications run-
ning in the system. We note that many modern processors
support hardware counters to measure the number of main
memory reads/writes and the associated stall cycles (perfor-
mance penalty), and make them available to the users via
special ISA support and software interface [9]. Using such
mechanisms, the OS can request to turn on DRAM Buffer
cache to minimize the performance impact of data encryp-
tion on NVM writes during application execution.
Finally, we note that there is an increasing demand for
Self-encrypting Drive (SED) solutions based on Trusted Com-
puting Group specifications to enable integrated encryption
and access control within the protected hardware of the hard
drive [10]. TCG’s open standards have allowed for multi-
vendor interoperability, and let the application developers
to operate with multiple SED providers. SED specifies the
standards for data confidentiality, and offers hardware-based
encryption solutions within the hard drive electronic circuits.
We note that such an openly available standard for hard drive
encryption offers us two possibilities in interfacing with non-
volatile main memory:
1. We could investigate mechanisms to integrate our en-
cryption based solution for NVMswith the already avail-
able hardware-based SED solutions. Essentially, this
solution calls for extension of the SED technology to
NV main memory. Though this is useful, we note that
the main memory is not expected to retain data be-
tween system-reboots unlike the memory disk that is
expected to retain (and preserve) the user data through-
out its lifetime. Therefore, the constraints posed by
data privacy needs of NVM-based memory might be
less stringent compared to disks.
2. We could decrypt the pages replaced from NVM, and
allow the SEDs to re-encrypt the data using their en-
cryption technology before being written to disks. Since
the disk-main memory data traffic is usually off-the-
performance-critical path for most applications (with
a few exceptions like data-streaming media applica-
tions), this option may be more acceptable and cheaper
for a vast majority of cases. In our current design, we
incorporate this solution to handle SED-based memory
disks (see Figure 1).
4. IMPLEMENTATION
Popular encryption algorithms such as DES, AES and RSA
have been widely studied, and a variety of optimized im-
plementations exist in hardware. Many existing encryption
algorithms are typically faster than the actual main memory
accesses, effectively hiding the encryption latency within the
actual memory access times. For instance, depending on the
processor frequency, optimized AES implementations con-
sume anywhere between 25-40 ns in time [11]. However,
access time for a 64-byte cache line, based on a 4 ns mem-
ory bus clock cycle, is expected to be 140 ns [4]. If the
data hits in the row buffer, the memory access latency is
even lower. Note that the row buffer data is already de-
crypted upon memory read, and does not need encryption
until data is written back to the NVM. To further keep the
performance impact minimal on certain memory-bound ap-
plications, hardware optimizations such as DRAM buffer
cache can be useful because they maintain the application’s
current working set and act as a fast access cache for NVM.
Even when the performance impact can effectively be hid-
den through optimizations, frequent invocation of encryp-
tion could adversely impact other system parameters such
as power and energy consumption. To reduce runtime im-
pact on application power (and sometimes performance too),
a first-order solution can be to use probabilistic and differ-
entiated encryption where individual memory banks are en-
crypted using different encryption algorithms. Naively speak-
ing, the type of encryption used within a particular bank
could be randomly chosen just to prevent remanent data from
being stolen easily, and the encryption keys belonging to
the different memory banks are stored separately within the
memory controller. This solution offers varying levels of
security to the different memory banks depending on the
encryption technology used. This differentiated approach
leads to reduced power and performance overheads espe-
cially when many of the memory banks can afford to use
low-cost encryption techniques at the cost of potentially re-
duced security for non-critical data. An un-informed choice
of algorithm in differentiated encryption can lead to poten-
tially compromising sensitive data that may be otherwise
unavailable to the adversary when stronger encryption tech-
niques are used.
A more effective alternative is when the OS and the user
could provide hints to the memory controller on the sensi-
tivity levels of data (e.g., the memory page contains impor-
tant kernel data structure pointers, the application has sensi-
tive user data inside the memory page). Based on the level
of protection needed, the OS assigns different security flags
(distinguishing the potent for threat) to the individual mem-
ory pages. Based on the OS-assigned security flags for a
memory page and the highest security demand among an
individual bank’s constituent pages, the memory controller
chooses an appropriate encryption algorithm for the entire
memory bank. Furthermore, with a simple memory page
map (maintained in the OS) to indicate the need to encryp-
tion/decryption, the choice to invoke encryption algorithm
can be made at the granularity of individual memory pages,
thus eliminating the need to encrypt all memory pages within
a bank. Note that, the choice of encryption algorithm for an
individual bank is still determined by the page that demands
the highest security within a bank.
The information needed to decide on whether to encrypt
memory pages and the appropriate level of security needed
can be derived statically based on the applications profile in-
formation from the OS, and can be dynamically re-calibrated
depending on the application phases. As an instance, an ap-
plication could work on sensitive data for a certain time-
frame during when high levels of data privacy is needed,
and may work on non-sensitive data during other periods of
time when stringent security can be relaxed and traded with
less secure encryption. If the application’s working data sets
do not overlap between two such distinct phases, the mem-
ory bank can switch to a lower-cost encryption algorithm.
To avoid any unintended, yet benign, reads from the now-
garbage memory pages (rendered unreadable because of a
different encryption algorithm during a previous application
phase), the OS can choose to explicitly mark these pages
as invalid. If the working set pages between two different
application phases are non-overlapping, this explicit mark-
ing of invalid pages by the OS should not incur any perfor-
mance overheads. In the event that the working set mem-
ory pages between two application phases are indeed over-
lapping, there are two alternatives: 1. Keep using the en-
cryption algorithm that was used in the previous phase and
pay additional costs that may be now-unnecessary for the
reduced level of security needed, 2. Switch to a lower cost
encryption, and invalidate the now-garbage memory pages
that will incur extra overheads when such pages are accessed
across the two phases. The choice of an appropriate alterna-
tive depends on the length (execution time) of each applica-
tion phase and the degree of memory page content sharing
between the two application runtime phases with distinct se-
curity needs.
In this design space where the OS or application may
make the appropriate data sensitivity information available
to the hardware, a third aggressive solution strategy would
be to completely eliminate encryption on certain memory
banks or the individual memory pages based on the appli-
cation profile information from the OS. Again, we note that
the applications could have phase-based behavior with dif-
fering security needs. Therefore, it is important to consider
the length of application phases and the degree of data shar-
ing between phases to study the usefulness of this differen-
tiated encryption with no encryption during certain phases.
5. EVALUATION
In this section, we perform evaluation of our proposed so-
lution strategy that counters persistence-based memory at-
tacks in NVM.We first outline our evaluation setup, and then
present our experimental results.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Our evaluation platform uses Gem5 [12], a full system
cycle-accurate simulator for modeling system-level and pro-
cessor microarchitectures. We integrated NVMain [13], a
cycle-accurate main memory simulator that models emerg-
ing non-volatile memory in Gem5. Our baseline models a
processor running at 1 GHz, with a private 2-way set associa-
tive L1 cache and a shared 2MB, 8-way set-associative LLC.
The block size is 64 Bytes in all caches. For the PCM-based
NVRAM, we model a single channel, 4-bank, 4 GB capacity
with 4 KB pages with read latency of 50 ns and write latency
of 1 µs [3]. For the hybrid memory with DRAM buffer
cache, we create a NVMain configuration that features a
128MB DRAM cache with 8 banks that acts as a fast ac-
cess cache to store the pre-decrypted application’s working
set and hides the decryption latency incurred for accessing
the PCM directly. The DRAM cache is set to share the same
memory channel as the off-chip PCM memory. We have in-
corporated McPAT [14] into our simulation infrastructure by
mapping Gem5’s simulation output to McPAT compatible
data format for processor power modeling. A baseline pro-
cessor based template file is created for McPAT’s internal
power calculation. We collected memory power consump-
tion data directly from NVMain’s simulation output statis-
tics. We use SPEC 2006 applications [15] with reference in-
puts, and the applications were run in system call emulation
mode. We fast-forward 700 million instructions to skip the
initialization phase, and then simulate 500 million instruc-
tions in detail.
In our evaluation, we use four different encryption algo-
rithms (DES, AES, RSA and differentiated encryption) un-
der two different memory configurations (PCM NVRAM
and hybrid PCM-DRAM) in our evaluation. The hardware
implementation of encryption techniques were based on op-
timized version described in various prior studies [4, 5, 6,
7, 11]. Based on the currently available data in the litera-
ture, DES hardware encryption incurs an average overhead
of about 7-10 processor cycles per word, AES hardware en-
cryption consumes about 12-15 cycles per word, and the
RSA hardware incurs penalty of 24-30 cycles per word. Us-
ing this data, we model the encryption overheads as the aver-
age number of cycles it takes to encrypt a main memory page
for a given encryption algorithm. The Gem5 configuration
files are modified accordingly to reflect the corresponding
encryption/decryption overheads for different algorithms.
5.2 Experimental Results
We ran over 20 SPEC applications. We observed that sev-
eral non-memory-intensive applications (e.g, GemsFDTD)
did not exhibit significant memory activity, and as a result,
the execution time (performance) and average power over-
heads in these benchmarks were negligible relative to a base-
line with no encryption. Therefore, in our experimental re-
sults section, we show the performance and average power
overhead results for six representative benchmarks from our
evaluation– bzip2, lbm, mcf, omnetpp, soplex and milc. mcf
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Figure 2: Execution time (performance) and Average Power overheads on SPEC 2006 benchmarks due to different hardware
encryption algorithms on 4GB PCM memory. Baseline has PCM NVM with no encryption.
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Figure 3: Execution time (performance) and Average Power overheads on SPEC 2006 benchmarks due to different hard-
ware encryption algorithms on 4GB PCM hybrid memory with a 128MB DRAM Cache. Baseline has PCM-DRAM with no
encryption.
and lbm are high memory-intensive applications (high num-
ber of LLC misses). The other four applications also have
memory-intensive activity from low to moderate levels.
Figure 2 shows the execution time and power overheads
on these six benchmarks using the different encryption algo-
rithms, where the baseline does not have any encryption. We
see that the mcf benchmark, with a high degree of memory
activity, consistently has higher performance overhead rang-
ing from 2.7% (DES) to 8.1% (RSA), and the corresponding
power overhead ranging from 1.3% to 3.8%.
Figure 3 illustrates the performance and average power
overheads on a hybrid PCM-DRAM. We observed that by
using a 128 MB DRAM buffer cache, the baseline IPC for
most memory-bound applications already increased notice-
ably. This is because the DRAM cache is able to store the
active working sets for these applications and thus reduce the
number of accesses to the PCM memory. Our experiments
show that the DRAM cache had beneficial effect in certain
applications by reducing their performance overheads, while
having a detrimental performance effect through further widen-
ing the execution time gap between the baseline and the en-
cryption in other applications. As examples:
1. In mcf benchmark, when compared to the memory con-
figuration without DRAM cache, the accesses to PCM
reduced by almost 63% with a DRAM cache. This
resulted in lowering of RSA encryption overhead from
8.1% (without DRAM cache) to about 6% (with DRAM
cache). Correspondingly, the power overheads for RSA
encryption also reduced from 3.8% (without DRAM
cache) to about 2.7% (with DRAM cache).
2. In milc benchmark, when compared to the memory
configuration without the DRAM cache, the DRAM
cache was only able to filter 15% of the accesses to
PCM.With the added DRAM lookup latency in the hy-
brid configuration and the still-dominant en(de)cryption
latencies (due to high DRAM miss rate), the RSA per-
formance overheads increased from about 5.2% (with-
out DRAM cache) to about 8.8% (with DRAM cache).
Based on our discussion in Section 4, we note that the
performance and power overheads of encryption can be im-
proved through the use of differentiated encryption strategy
that chooses to boost encryption in security-critical phases
and adopt low-cost encryption schemes for non-critical phases.
To demonstrate the use of our probabilistic, differentiated
encryption, we conduct experiments where we assume that
the application has highly security-sensitive computations
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Figure 4: Execution time (performance) and Average Power overheads on SPEC 2006 benchmarks due to different hardware
encryption algorithms on a 4GB PCM memory. Baseline has PCM NVM with no encryption.
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Figure 5: Execution time (performance) and Average Power overheads on SPEC 2006 benchmarks due to different hardware
encryption algorithms on a 4GB PCM memory with a 128MB DRAMCache. Baseline has PCM-DRAM with no encryption.
for about 25% of its runtime (RSA is used for encryption),
moderately security-sensitive computations for about 60%
of its runtime (AES is used for encryption) and less sensi-
tive computation for the remaining time (DES is for protec-
tion during this time). This assumption is made to illustrate
an average application that has phases of sensitivity during
its lifetime. Figure 4 show our experimental results on a
PCM based NVRAM where we observe that even memory-
intensive mcf exhibit relatively low performance overheads
of around 5%. Figure 5 shows the performance and power
overheads of our differentiated encryption when a hybrid
memory system is used. Our results show that milc bench-
mark has the maximum performance overhead of 5.9% and
power overhead of 2.8% respectively. These results shows
that a good security-performance tradeoff can be achieved
by customizing the encryption of data based on the security
needs of the application phases.
6. RELATEDWORK
Prior techniques have studied memory persistence based
attacks in NVM. In contrast to i-NVMM [16] that incremen-
tally encrypts the memory resident data incurring additional
memory writes, our technique performs encryption of data
prior to the actual memory writes. In this way, our approach
minimizes the exacerbation of limited write endurance prob-
lem that have already plagued the widespread adoption of
many NVM technologies.
Enck et al. [4] have proposed encryption using a special
key stored specially in a smart card, and one-time pads that
are added to the data prior to encryption. This method re-
quires extensive modifications to cache blocks such as addi-
tion of several state bits to avoid repetition of one-time pad
counters. Note that the read operations (that are often per-
formance critical) still suffer due to decryption latency. In
contrast, our solution approach explores minimal changes to
the memory hardware with features to improve performance
overheads via buffer caches and differentiated encryption.
To address the limited write endurance problem and en-
hance PCM cell lifetime, Qureshi et al. [1] have proposed
line-level write back instead of redundant write operations
to the entire memory page. We note that such techniques can
be utilized in conjunction with wear-leveling techniques [17]
to minimize the possibility of early memory cell wear-out in
NVM technologies.
Recently Awad et al. [18] observed that the OS does data
shredding where newly allocated pages are zeroed out to
protect the remnant data from the previous owner process of
that page. They noted that data shredding could cause write
endurance issues for NVM especially when a large percent-
age of writes to the Non-volatile memory are for zeroing out
the page’s contents. To address this, they propose a hardware
mechanism to delay the zeroing out the data bit values until
when a cache block from a newly allocated page is read by
the LLC. This saves unnecessary ‘zero’ writes to the NVM.
We note that this improved data shredding strategy could be
combined with our proposed differentiated encryption to en-
hance both the security and to minimize the performance im-
pact on the application runtime.
Other prior studies [19, 20] have proposed encryption ar-
chitectures that provide tamper-proof computations and mem-
ory protection, and mechanisms to protect virtual memory [21].
Our proposed solution can work synergistically with all of
such prior solutions to enhance the NVM security. In ad-
dition to improving memory reliability, we note that other
mechanisms to improve software robustness [22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28] will improve overall system security.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented smart mechanisms to lever-
age the hardware encryption methods for enhanced NVRAM
security against data remanence attacks, and explored tech-
niques to make it harder for an adversary to steal the persis-
tent data left in the non-volatile memory after power down or
in-between system sleep periods. Our mechanism takes into
account the limited write endurance problem associated with
several non-volatile memory technologies including PCM,
and avoids any additional writes beyond those issued by the
system normally. We showed experimental results demon-
strating the performance and power overheads of using en-
cryption techniques on two different memory configurations-
a PCM-based NVRAM and a hybrid PCM-DRAM mem-
ory configuration. We also studied differentiated encryp-
tion strategy where the encryption algorithm is chosen based
on the security needs of the application phases. We showed
that this strategy delivers security for the critical application
phases and improves the performance of other non-security-
critical phases of the application. Our experimental results
show that our mechanisms incur low performance penalty
even in memory-intensive applications and exhibit low aver-
age power overheads.
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